It is possible to discern an insight which underlies Tarski's approach to decidability problems for elementary (and restricted) theories. Roughly speaking, Tarski's results proceed from an analysis of definability within the various relevant theories. Thus, Tarski's approach is fundamentally semantical, taking advantage of the expressive power of the formalisms at hand. The notion of interpretability of definability of the fundamental notions of one theory in another-is a key ingredient in Tarski's work. Indeed, results about the undecidability of various theories are only one kind of consequence of Tarski's work with the notion of interpretability; in certain cases undecidability was not the principal goal. Some results of this kind are discussed below, even though they were motivated by concerns other than decidability.
Perhaps Tarski's most far-reaching contribution to our understanding of undecidable theories is the paper A general method in proofs of undecidability, which is the first of the three papers that comprise the book Undecidable theories by Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson [53m] . The material contained in this paper originated during 1938-1939, hard upon the first discovery of undecidable elementary theories by Church [1936] and [1936a] and by Rosser [l1936] . Building on the celebrated results of Gddel [1931] , Church had shown that elementary Peano arithmetic and certain of its subtheories, notably the logical validities for the language of arithmetic, are undecidable. Rosser advanced the work begun by Church and proved that elementary Peano arithmetic has the property that each of its consistent extensions is also undecidable. Theories, like elementary Peano arithmetic, with this property were called by Tarski essentially undecidable theories.
The method described by Tarski has become well known under the name of the "method of interpretation". The method used by Church and Rosser (and later by others, including Tarski) might be called the "direct method". In essence, the direct method proceeds by faithfully coding one of the many versions of the notion of recursive function into the target theory, the theory to be shown undecidable. Once this is accomplished, the algorithmic unsolvability of, let us say, the halting problem can be invoked. The direct method is difficult, even forbidding, in most cases. It tends to rely on a combinatorial or syntactical emulation which may carry no particular meaning within the theory at hand. In contrast, the method of interpretation makes effective use of the expressive power of elementary languages in order to reduce the undecidability of one theory to that of another. To illustrate the method, consider the theory Th <c(, +, *, < > of the natural numbers and the theory Th <Z, +, * > of the ring of integers. The first is undecidable, according to the work of Church and Rosser. By a well-known theorem of Lagrange, an integer is nonnegative if and only if it can be written as a sum of four squares. This can be readily expressed by a formula *(x) in the elementary language of rings. The same applies to the order relation: 3u[O(u) A (x + u = y)] is an elementary formula in the language of rings which, in <Z, +, .>, defines the order relation. So it is possible to associate with each sentence 4, in the language of the natural numbers, a new sentence 4 *, in the language of rings, which is obtained from 4 by using the formula written out above in place of x < y and by restricting the variables to range over the set defined by * (x). Clearly, / is true of <(o, +, *, < > if and only if / * is true of <Z, +,5* >. Hence the elementary theory of the ring of integers must be undecidable.
In order to establish the undecidability of a theory T it suffices to show that some essentially undecidable theory To can be interpreted, not necessarily in T, but (what is much easier) in some consistent extension of T-provided only that To is finitely axiomatizable. This implies that a consistent extension T'0 of To can be interpreted in a consistent extension T' of T that is finitely axiomatizable relative to T. T' is undecidable since To is essentially undecidable. Thus T' is undecidable, and the undecidability of T follows by the deduction theorem from the fact that T' is finitely axiomatizable relative to T. This method opened the way for many applications, the earliest due to Tarski himself. In fact, using his method, Tarski In order to use the method of interpretation, as originally conceived by Tarski, it is necessary to have a finitely axiomatizable, essentially undecidable theory which is weak enough in its own means of expression to hold out the hope that it can be interpreted into theories quite distant from it. At least the first such theory must arise by some means other than the method of interpretation itself. In the late 1930's, only Peano arithmetic and its consistent extensions as well as various versions of set theory were known to be essentially undecidable. However, it was known that Peano arithmetic is not finitely axiomatizable and, even disregarding its possible inconsistency, set theory is so rich in its mathematical content that it seems difficult to interpret it into any wide variety of other theories. Mostowski and Tarski [1971] . The influence of Tarski's method of interpretation on Mal'cev's work is evident on even a superficial reading. At the hands of the Novosibirsk school and others in the Soviet Union, the method of interpretation was first refined and then recast in a more powerful form and many applications were obtained. These are gathered in the survey by Ershov, Lavrov, Talimanov, and Taitslin [1965] , which also includes a number of sections taken from Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson [53m] with little or no modification (thus making them widely available in Russian). A somewhat different and powerful variation on the method of interpretation, usually called the Rabin-Scott method, was described in Rabin [1965] . These techniques, as well as the direct method, are very much in use today. For example, using the Rabin-Scott variant, Burris and McKenzie [1981] have shown that the elementary theory of a congruence modular variety of algebras must be undecidable, unless the variety admits a very strong structure theorem, and McKenzie [1982] , following the work of Zamjatin [1978] , has shown that the elementary theory of any class V of groups is hereditarily undecidable, provided only that V contains all the subdirect powers of some nonabelian group.
The whole concept of interpretability has a long and intricate mathematical history. It is clearly present in Descartes' approach to geometry, and it can be seen in every coordinatization theorem since. It has been used to establish relative consistency results since the emergence of hyperbolic geometry. In Tarski's work, it is almost in the title of his monograph A decision method for elementary algebra and geometry [ Let us now turn to Tarski's work concerning the undecidability of theories of a restricted kind. Using the method of interpretation, Tarski was able to produce a finitely axiomatizable equational theory which is essentially undecidable. He did this by interpreting set theory into an equational theory of relation algebras with additional distinguished individual constant symbols.
Tarski observed in A general method in proofs of undecidability that it is possible to interpret the quantifiers and connectives as well as the fundamental operation and relation symbols of a theory. When he made that observation, he had in hand an extensive manuscript (which was to grow into Tarski .) It should be stressed here that it is interpretation of the quantifiers and connectives, rather than a coding of them, which Tarski used.
Roughly speaking, an intended model of Tarski's axioms for relation algebra is a collection of binary relations on some set U which is closed with respect to the (Boolean) operations of intersection, union, and complementation and also with respect to the formation of converses and of the composition of two relations. The identity relation restricted to U is taken as a distinguished constant. In this way, the intention is that a relation algebra turn out to be an expansion of a Boolean set algebra. Tarski's plan for interpreting an elementary theory To into an equational theory T of relation algebras, possibly with additional distinguish elements, was very natural: variables ranging over individuals and individual constant symbols of T, which are intended to represent binary relations, are used to interpret the predicates of To, the Boolean operation symbols of T interpret the connectives of To, the identity constant symbol of T interprets the equality symbol of To, and, finally, the operation symbol of T for composition of relations can be used to produce an interpretation of the existential quantifier. (Write out a definition of composition to see where the quantifier is!) There are two substantial barriers to the success of this plan. First, it has turned out that not all models of Tarski's axioms for relation algebras are representable as algebras of binary relations with fundamental operations as described above; see Lyndon [1950] . Second, the interpretation of the existential quantifier suggested above is not really powerful enough. It can only handle elementary sentences in which no more than three distinct variables occur. However, Tarski was able to show that if To was powerful enough to provide the means to define a pairing function, then both of these difficulties could be overcome. Tarski's demonstration that certain equational theories of relation algebras are undecidable is an example of a restricted decision problem. Another example is the world problem for groups. It is possible to make a rough comparison of these two problems. Novikov [1955] and Boone [1954] discovered finitely presented groups which have recursively unsolvable word problems. This means that the language of group theory can be expanded by finitely many new constant symbols, and a finite set a of equations involving no variables can be constructed so that the set of all logical consequences of F u a which are equations without variables is not recursive, where F is the set of equations axiomatizing group theory. Tarski's result can be cast in the same form and one could say that he constructed a finitely presented relation algebra with an unsolvable word problem (but this would miss much of the point, since what Tarski did was offer an equational interpretation of set theory!). Now using the fact that a is a finite set of equations, the deduction theorem entails that the consequences of F, which have the form of quasi-identities (alias strict basic Horn sentences) without variables, also constitute a nonrecursive set. Finally, observing that the new constants do not occur in F, one can conclude that the universal Horn theory of groups is undecidable. In relation algebra, enough of the apparatus of the logical connectives remains, so that, loosely speaking, the argument just given can be conducted at the equational level, the result being a finitely axiomatizable undecidable equational theory of relation algebras. Notice that the essentially undecidable equational theory discussed above concerns relation algebras with additional individual constant symbols, and it is not an equational theory of relation algebras. [1980] . Tarski was sharply aware that the meager means of expression available in such restricted settings makes results of this kind much more difficult, generally speaking, than the demonstration of the undecidability of full elementary theories. Tarski spoke highly of the results of Novikov and Boone, and later of the demonstration by R. Freese [1980] of the undecidability of the equational theory of modular lattices.
Here is a mathematical aside. The fourth sort of contribution Tarski made in the area of undecidability concerns decision problems of the second degree. These problems center on the existence of algorithms for discerning of each theory in a given class whether or not it has a given property. For example, is there an algorithm for determining whether elementary theories are consistent? Now an elementary theory is an infinite object and is, therefore, unsuitable as an input of an algorithm. To avoid problems of this kind, Tarski imposed a restriction to finite sets. For example, given a fixed finite language, is the collection of all finite consistent sets of sentences recursive? What about the collection of all finite sets of sentences which axiomatize decidable elementary theories? In A general method in proofs of undecidability, Tarski observes that the answer to both of these questions is no, provided only that some finitely axiomatizable essentially undecidable theory can be formulated in the language. The simple proof relies heavily on the availability of negation and the use of the deduction theorem. Problems of this kind, when addressed to finite presentations of semigroups instead of finite sets of sentences, had been investigated by Markov [1951a,b] . In the setting of group presentations, they were investigated by Adjan [1958] and Rabin [1958] . The results obtained, both for semigroups and groups, are quite powerful. Tarski had raised similar problems earlier with regard to the propositional calculus. For example, at the Princeton Bicentennial in 1946 he asked whether the collection of finite sets of propositions which could axiomatize propositional logic (using modus ponens and substitution as the only rules of inference) was recursive. Linial and Post [1949] Mathematics, in the end, is a work of the human spirit as much as it is a work of the intellect. For me, Alfred Tarski's greatest contributions to the advancement of the mathematical enterprise arose from the vitality of his engagement with the full range of human experience, from his generosity of mind and spirit, from his genuine interest in the lives of other people, and from his warm hospitality and great personal charm. Because of attributes like these, Alfred Tarski attracted, supported, and encouraged what seems like whole generations of talented people throughout the world, to the benefit of mathematical logic.
